For the last generation, or at least as long as I have been pursuing an academic career, a great big raspberry has been directed at the nuclear arsenal by most, close to all, academics I have encountered. This position might need to be reconsidered. At least I think it should be reconsidered in light of a very thoughtful argument made by Adam Lowther in The National Interest (read Adam Lowther's piece here).
Prior to the end of the Cold War academes roundly criticized the presence of a nuclear force as threatening to human existence. Truth exists in that stance. Nuclear weapons do threaten human existence as they kill and destroy with much greater ease than conventional weaponry--but do not tell this to the dead. maimed, permanently scarred from all of the wars of mankind since 1945. After the Cold War the argument was what need do we have of a nuclear arsenal when there is no menacing Soviet threat.
Adam Lowther cogently points out that a policy shift will be necessary to mate future military capability with national security concerns. The fact is that with a constricted budget we will not be able to do militarily nearly as much brushfire fighting as we have shifted to since 1980. This brings back into play a nuclear arsenal which can truly be used as a deterrent. Of course, now we can probably argue about deterrence theories. But, at least this is something we might consider as we work toward new policy directions driven by economic realities. Anyway, I like good arguments and believe all angles should be considered, so consider Lowther's argument.
Prior to the end of the Cold War academes roundly criticized the presence of a nuclear force as threatening to human existence. Truth exists in that stance. Nuclear weapons do threaten human existence as they kill and destroy with much greater ease than conventional weaponry--but do not tell this to the dead. maimed, permanently scarred from all of the wars of mankind since 1945. After the Cold War the argument was what need do we have of a nuclear arsenal when there is no menacing Soviet threat.
Adam Lowther cogently points out that a policy shift will be necessary to mate future military capability with national security concerns. The fact is that with a constricted budget we will not be able to do militarily nearly as much brushfire fighting as we have shifted to since 1980. This brings back into play a nuclear arsenal which can truly be used as a deterrent. Of course, now we can probably argue about deterrence theories. But, at least this is something we might consider as we work toward new policy directions driven by economic realities. Anyway, I like good arguments and believe all angles should be considered, so consider Lowther's argument.
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