I have kept some of my reading and researching time open to Central and South Asia since writing a paper about ethnic and tribal factions creating political consolidation problems in Tajikistan as an undergraduate in the mid 1990s. So, it has probably been less surprising to me than some how issues of ethnic and tribal identity have kinked things up in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. One thing I have been fond of doing when trying to understand an area is to also study the history of particular countries and regions (while not a particular fan of saying ancient hatreds cause today's problems or of primordialist arguments regarding identity, I do find it interesting to note learned and repeated behaviors and changes in political and social structures over time). These reading activities have led me to note the topic du'jour of the day: U.S.--Pakistan relations.
Everyone knows that last week Haqqani network terrorists/insurgents (what should we call them since they are transnationals and not native to the country in question?) were involved in attacks on U.S., NATO, and Afghani targets in Kabul. Now we can read here that Admiral Mullen (chairman of the JCS) says it is Pakistan's fault that the Haqqani are active again in Kabul. You can also read here that top officials of the U.S. govt are all starting to say "Pakistan must stop supporting the Haqqani network or else," (direct quote from the Foreign Policy article referenced above).
I wonder, however, just how successful our attempt at strong arming the Pakistani government will be given Pakistani perceptions of our relations with India. Also, does Pakistan misperceive the ability to use Afghanistan as strategic movement and retreat space given an assault on Pakistan by India? And finally, for anyone who read The Great Game and other histories of this region, how much does this sound like the late 1930s wrangling between Dost Mohammed, Ranjit Singh, Shah Shujah, and the strong arm tactics of Lord Auckland (then Governor General of India) used against Dost Mohammed?
Everyone knows that last week Haqqani network terrorists/insurgents (what should we call them since they are transnationals and not native to the country in question?) were involved in attacks on U.S., NATO, and Afghani targets in Kabul. Now we can read here that Admiral Mullen (chairman of the JCS) says it is Pakistan's fault that the Haqqani are active again in Kabul. You can also read here that top officials of the U.S. govt are all starting to say "Pakistan must stop supporting the Haqqani network or else," (direct quote from the Foreign Policy article referenced above).
I wonder, however, just how successful our attempt at strong arming the Pakistani government will be given Pakistani perceptions of our relations with India. Also, does Pakistan misperceive the ability to use Afghanistan as strategic movement and retreat space given an assault on Pakistan by India? And finally, for anyone who read The Great Game and other histories of this region, how much does this sound like the late 1930s wrangling between Dost Mohammed, Ranjit Singh, Shah Shujah, and the strong arm tactics of Lord Auckland (then Governor General of India) used against Dost Mohammed?
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