Like most people when I hear the term threat assessment my mind leaps to a military mode or to a personal security mode. I automatically start to think about physical threat issues and how to defend myself, my family, my friends, fellow travelers of the moment, etc. Or, if the conversation of threat assessment is in the context of international relations I think about security of populations, particularly the security of the population living in the United States. Security, by the way, is not just immediate physical threat, and must recognize that security of general welfare is a major part of security of physical existence. With these definitional issues in mind, let me turn to what I sat down at the computer to write this morning.
For the last 20 years I have divided my personal research and teaching considerations between two regions of the world--Sub-Saharan Africa and East/Southeast Asia. In 1998 I was asked about my assessment of China as a military threat to the United States, as I worked through my assessment of the goals of Chinese foreign policy for a research project. At that time I answered the question with a semi-shrug--I honestly was not certain of my assessment at that time. I did note the growth of modernization of the PRC military and particularly the emphasis on technological advancement as well as hardware advancement in the air and naval services. And in noting those efforts I did state that I believed China did not pose a current (late 1990s) military threat to the U.S. if our foreign policies clashed in the Asia-Pacific region, but could pose a threat in 15-20 years. I also soft pedaled on the issue of China rising as global power, arguing instead that their interests were much more localized to the East/Southeast Asia region.
For my two cents in 2015, I stand by the initial part of my assessment. China was not a military threat to the U.S. in 1998 if our foreign policies and interactions came into conflict. Guess what, it is 15-20 years later, and guess what, I now assess the PRC military to be a force to consider if PRC and U.S. foreign policies come into conflict.
Why is this reconsideration important? First, we are still obligated by treaty to defend Japan. Second, even with the one China policy, we are obligated to the defense of Taiwan (ROC) should the PRC decide that the ROC should no longer exist and determine to physically change the status quo. Third, we have allies in the South China Sea region who are clashing with China right now over resource interests in the South China Sea and over ownership interests of the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea. Fourth, we have economic interests in the South China Sea--those little things called Sea Lanes of Communication, where ships transit with about 50% of the goods traded in the world today and over 80% of goods traded in the Asia-Pacific region.
Should I also reconsider the goals of Chinese foreign policy and my argument about the PRC's determination to become a global power? Why yes, yes I should. I was incorrect in the late 1990s. The PRC is determined to become a global power and to challenge the United States for primacy. I do not believe in global hegemony--no state can bear the costs for long enough to maintain such position. I do believe in regional hegemonic aspiration and desire for primacy. When a representative of the PRC speaks about multi-polarity, what they are directly challenging is the notion of U.S. economic/political primacy in the world. There exist good reasons to challenge the idea of whether the U.S. is still in a position of primacy in the world and even if the U.S. is in a position of primacy multi-polarity still exists. The PRC desires to hold equal position at the least and superior position optimally in relation to the U.S. My blog is not the best place to discuss all of these issues in great detail as the purpose is to express some thoughts and draw some interest in discussions with those who might read my meandering thoughts. So, I guess I will just have to do something academic about these thoughts and ideas floating around in my brain today.
For the last 20 years I have divided my personal research and teaching considerations between two regions of the world--Sub-Saharan Africa and East/Southeast Asia. In 1998 I was asked about my assessment of China as a military threat to the United States, as I worked through my assessment of the goals of Chinese foreign policy for a research project. At that time I answered the question with a semi-shrug--I honestly was not certain of my assessment at that time. I did note the growth of modernization of the PRC military and particularly the emphasis on technological advancement as well as hardware advancement in the air and naval services. And in noting those efforts I did state that I believed China did not pose a current (late 1990s) military threat to the U.S. if our foreign policies clashed in the Asia-Pacific region, but could pose a threat in 15-20 years. I also soft pedaled on the issue of China rising as global power, arguing instead that their interests were much more localized to the East/Southeast Asia region.
For my two cents in 2015, I stand by the initial part of my assessment. China was not a military threat to the U.S. in 1998 if our foreign policies and interactions came into conflict. Guess what, it is 15-20 years later, and guess what, I now assess the PRC military to be a force to consider if PRC and U.S. foreign policies come into conflict.
Why is this reconsideration important? First, we are still obligated by treaty to defend Japan. Second, even with the one China policy, we are obligated to the defense of Taiwan (ROC) should the PRC decide that the ROC should no longer exist and determine to physically change the status quo. Third, we have allies in the South China Sea region who are clashing with China right now over resource interests in the South China Sea and over ownership interests of the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea. Fourth, we have economic interests in the South China Sea--those little things called Sea Lanes of Communication, where ships transit with about 50% of the goods traded in the world today and over 80% of goods traded in the Asia-Pacific region.
Should I also reconsider the goals of Chinese foreign policy and my argument about the PRC's determination to become a global power? Why yes, yes I should. I was incorrect in the late 1990s. The PRC is determined to become a global power and to challenge the United States for primacy. I do not believe in global hegemony--no state can bear the costs for long enough to maintain such position. I do believe in regional hegemonic aspiration and desire for primacy. When a representative of the PRC speaks about multi-polarity, what they are directly challenging is the notion of U.S. economic/political primacy in the world. There exist good reasons to challenge the idea of whether the U.S. is still in a position of primacy in the world and even if the U.S. is in a position of primacy multi-polarity still exists. The PRC desires to hold equal position at the least and superior position optimally in relation to the U.S. My blog is not the best place to discuss all of these issues in great detail as the purpose is to express some thoughts and draw some interest in discussions with those who might read my meandering thoughts. So, I guess I will just have to do something academic about these thoughts and ideas floating around in my brain today.
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