Monday, April 25, 2011

Syria

Since 2000 I have followed political conflict in Syria with some interest.  I first started looking at Syria as part of a set of case studies that were first written for my dissertation and in 2010 my case study of ethnic conflict in Syria was published here.  What is not being discussed in the information distribution networks (Retuers, AFP, AP, etc.) is the ethnic dimension of uprisings in Syria.  Syria is 74% Sunni, Shia and Alawi comprise about 13% of the population with the Alawi population being less than 10%.  Most people I meet have no clue about the Alawi population, so here is a little information about the Alawi:

The Alawis are an Islamic ethnic group in which religion is not the primary identity characteristic. Alawis means “those who adhere to the teachings of Ali.” Ali was the son-in-law of Muhammad, the founder of Islam. The Alawis differ with traditional Islam in their rejection of dietary restrictions, and social restrictions. Additionally, Alawis view politics as separate from religion and consider themselves to be secular Muslims. In Syria the Alawis are descendants of an ancient group that populated the area of the coastal plain. They still maintain many Christian (Byzantine) practices—including the celebration of Christmas, Easter and Epiphany. Most Sunnis consider the Alawis as more heretical than Jews. The Alawis are reported in the historical accounts of Alexander the Great’s incursion into the region and in the accounts of the Holy Wars. Physically they differ from other Syrians in that many are blond haired and blue-eyed. Alawites make up less than ten percent of the population but control the government and military.

The Alawis are an excellent example of an advantaged ethnic minority group. By their seizure of power in the Ba’ath party and of the Syrian government under the leadership of Hafez Al-Assad, the Alawis positioned themselves to control a country and to control a society. To maintain his control over Syria, Assad instituted martial law that was still in effect during the years in this study. The primary concern for this group is how to maintain their advantage in the society. This advantage rested in the ability of Assad to stay in power. Until his death in 2000, Assad managed to stay in power by arresting and imprisoning anyone suspected of disloyalty and then releasing prisoners at times when it was necessary to appease factions of the majority population.



Bashar Al-Assad, the son and successor of Hafez Al-Assad, inherited a situation that required constant repression and appeasement of the majority in order to maintain power and control.  Appeasements since 2000 include the Syrian support for Iranian ambitions in the region, and support for Hezbollah (Assad has no real love for Radical Islamic Fundamentalism which views his own people as heretical in their religious and social practices).  Repression and appeasement are at opposite ends of the arc of the pendulum, when appeasement fails, the government swings back--usually too far--to repression, often operationalized at a high level of violence (anybody remember Hama (1982) with 20,000 dead when Hafez Al-Assad went after the Muslim Brotherhood and its primary location of popular support?). 

So, I am not surprised at the reports of government crackdowns on protestors.  The appeasement was offered--less restrictions on public activity.  The stick will be used--crackdown on anti-government protestors.  Who will win?

No comments:

Post a Comment