Again Thinking Bullpup

Always looking at new and interesting bullpup designs.  This one by Desert Tech reminds me a little of the Israeli Tavor (a model I do like).  So, hey maybe I could be persuaded to look closer since it does come in 7.62x51 NATO.

Shameless Personal Advertisement

For my interested readers in the area, I'll be on Night Talk: Get to the Point Friday August 1st as part of a panel of local academics discussing current events.  The program is live from 8 to 9 pm on PCNC.  Looking forward to hearing the thoughts of my fellow panel members.

Foreign Policy "Creation" or "Zen"

I, like most international relations/security studies folks, have been following the events in Ukraine and Israel/Gaza with great interest.  I make no claim of special knowledge and fact.  I do, however, have my own opinions regarding the facts (thanks Daniel Patrick Moynihan for the great statement).  Human opinions regarding facts and what the facts indicate for the future is what truly drives the development of foreign policy.  In thinking about how I would recommend the U.S. government should respond to the facts (particularly in Ukraine and Israel/Gaza, but also thinking about North Korean statements, Chinese actions/statements, continued unrest in Libya, South Sudan, and I can go on with the list), I found some interesting commentary in the last few days provided by Daniel Drezner (here is the Drezner Link) and Josh Busby (here is Busby Link).   I recommend to everyone a quick perusal of these articles.

For my own two cents, I caution people to remember that taking the long arching view of humanity and ideological growth in our world does not mean isolationism.  The "Zen" crowd might be wary of taking hasty actions, but this does not equate to inaction.  Structural realists generally believe that you must determine which interests are the most important (the interests are facts, which ones are most important are opinion) and act on those specific important interests.  In other words, do not sweat the small stuff, do not run off to fight battles that do not need to be fought just because someone offers you a battle.

Further, I caution against being hard on the "Reality Creators".  The proponents of this view (neoconservatives and liberal internationalists) are also looking at facts.  In the opinion of reality creators the facts justify/warrant/demand immediate action.  Busby says that there is room to manuever between the two positions and he is, in my opinion, correct.  So, read up, enjoy and use these ideas to figure out your own opinion regarding the facts we are presented and the appropriate responses.  Makes for good arguments over good cigars.

CAR Ceasefire?

Seeing a headline that said rebels signed ceasefire agreement in the Central African Republic caused me momentary happiness this morning.  Then I read the accompanying story.  The rebel leader signing the ceasefire agreement was Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, a Seleka general who split with the leadership of the Seleka movement last year.  Recently Michel Djotodia, the Seleka leader who took the presidency of CAR after the Seleka uprising and then abused the population greatly before being forced into exile in January of 2014 has been reinstated as the head of Seleka.  Named as Djotodia's two deputies are Nourredine Adam and Dhaffane.

For my two cents regarding the veracity of the commitment, I'll wait and see.  I am not so happy as I was because the agreement was signed by Dhaffane and not Djotodia or all three of the Seleka leaders.  The problem is that Djotodia and Adam are both under sanction by the UN and arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court exist for both Djotodia and Adam.  The threat of arrest for former government leaders by the ICC and by courts claiming human rights jurisdiction beyond their own borders (remember that European state courts have tried to arrest several former leaders of countries other than their own for human rights abuses--think about the Spanish judge ordering the arrest of Pinochet for crimes against humanity while Pinochet was in England for medical treatment) hampers the ability for all relevant parties to be part of a negotiated settlement.  Djotodia and Adam cannot be included in the negotiations because of fear of arrest--this is problem number one with this ceasefire agreement.  Problem number two, Dhaffane split with the leadership of Seleka last year.  I realize he has been named one of the deputies this year, but does his view regarding the ceasefire equal the view of the entire leadership of Seleka?  

Territorial Sovereignty--South China Sea Edition

As I keep track of the South China Sea disputes between ten states I remain constantly amazed at the Chinese rhetoric regarding territorial sovereignty.  The latest statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry claim "irrefutable sovereignty"* over the Spratly Islands.  For my two cents a slight problem exists with this statement by the Chinese government.

*China's Foreign Ministry repeated that it had irrefutable sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, where most of the competing claims overlap, and that China continued to demand the immediate withdrawal of personnel and equipment of countries which were "illegally occupying" China's islands.

Can any sovereignty over territory exist in an "irrefutable state" if other Westphalian recognizable entities make claim on the same territory?  Legal equality of sovereigns (states) dictates that states are able to govern without interference over the population within the territory recognized as belonging to the population being governed.  I have always favored the recognition of that idea of sovereignty as I would not like foreign governments dictating to my own government how to govern my behavior.  In fact, the thought of most European governments actions toward their own citizens and control over their citizens' behaviors makes me cringe, and these are considered democratic governments.  But who recognizes states and the territory over which a state is sovereign?  The simple answer is other states.

If other states do not recognize a state's right to rule over the population in a certain territory is the sovereignty irrefutable?  The Philippine government can make the same claim as the Chinese government as can the Vietnamese government as can the Sultan of Brunei (and I could go on here with the list).  So, obviously the sovereignty is not irrefutable and Chinese rhetoric on the issue is not going to help settle the issue.  Continued unilateral attempts to settle the issue can only be based on coercive action.  Will non-regional states allow coercive action to settle the issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea?  China is also telling the non-regional actors to stay out.*

*China "hopes that countries outside the region strictly maintain their neutrality, clearly distinguish right from wrong and earnestly respect the joint efforts of countries in the region to maintain regional peace and stability"...

This last statement leaves me confused.  Apparently non-regional states are supposed to be neutral.  What does that mean about the actual regional claimants to the territory?  This statement means regional actors are not expected to be neutral, and that fact belies the Chinese claim of irrefutable sovereignty.

Why Hamas Escalated Now

Hey, I believe in being even handed.  Good piece regarding Hamas' reasons for escalating in Political Violence @ a Glance.  My thoughts on the matter tend to echo those of the author (Allison Hodgkins).  For my two cents, Hamas cannot appear to be simply another Fatah.  Hamas must maintain credibility of its effort to be the leaders of the Palestinian cause and has chosen this moment as the right time to escalate.  Hamas is also not particularly willing to listen to Egypt at the moment because the current government of Egypt is the one that removed a Hamas friendly regime from power.  

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Why Hamas Escalated, When Before They Didn’t

by politicalviolenceataglance on July 15, 2014

By Allison Beth Hodgkins

Just a short while ago it seemed that the Islamic militant group Hamas had everything to gain by moderation and had little interest in escalating tensions with Israel. As I wrote previously on this blog, Egyptian president Morsi’s ouster was a disaster for Hamas. Since late last year, Egypt’s crackdown on the tunnels into Gaza and loss of support left Hamas struggling to pay the salaries of its civil servants and witnessing a slide in public opinion polls. The unity deal not only gave Hamas a bump in the polls, but also promised financial relief and the prospect of improved access to the Rafah crossing with Egypt. Of course, all these incentives were dependent on maintaining quiet. 

And then we have the kidnapping and murder of three teenage Israeli settlers in the West Bank, an uptick in rocket fire, this July 4th screed to warn of hellfire and brimstone and then, as of July 7, 2014, Hamas made good on the promises in their most recent screed and lobbed there rockets as far as the outskirts of Jerusalem. And as Israeli airstrikes drove up the number of Palestinian dead, Hamas, almost gleefully, warned airlines to stay clear of Israel’s Ben Gurion airport.

 So what gives? After upholding a ceasefire agreement for almost two years and swallowing the crow sandwich that was the unity deal, why let loose and risk it all just for the pleasure of proving what big rockets they have?

At the risk of sounding Kerry-esque, the simple truth is that Hamas was against escalation until it was for it. The chain of events since those teens were seized en-route from Jerusalem has steadily eroded Hamas’ room to maneuver and backed it, inexorably, into a corner where it had to chose between the Russian roulette of escalation and irrelevance. It chose the former — a high stakes gamble to reclaim the mantle of resistor in chief on behalf of the struggle and shore up its tenuous stake in the Palestinian marketplace.

To a large degree, Shlomi Eldar gets it mostly right here when he says that Hamas’ main objective is to avoid looking like a defeated movement. What it really can’t afford to look like is a religiously conservative version of Fatah: weak, ineffective and seen as trading a continued hold on power for continued occupation. While the business of governing the fractious Gaza Strip has forced Hamas to make compromises in order to pay the bills and keep the sewage from overflowing, these compromises have required enforcing the November 2012 ceasefire on all the resistance factions in the strip. This is no easy task in good times (or not so bad times), but with the popular mood turning from generally irritated to downright irate, groups like Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and other new challengers smell blood in the water.

According to this very convoluted report, there was a meeting in Gaza around July 2nd in which Hamas apparently tried to convince the various armed factions to uphold the truce. They failed. The other factions in the meeting saw no reason to uphold a truce, especially since the newly formed government of national consensus decided not to pay the salaries of Gazan civil servants as supposedly promised in the unity deal. The street wanted escalation and so they would have it, calls for moderation be damed.

The IDF claims that there were around 5 or so rockets being fired out of Gaza on a daily basis throughout the month of June. Those rockets appear to have been of the limited range variety. From July 1, the number of rockets increases slightly: to 10, 15, 20 and finally 40, however the range is the same. This pattern concurs with the assertion that the early round of missiles was largely the work of the PFLP or other factions with less firepower and an interest in demonstrating their resistance bonafides. It is not until July 7, after Israel struck a tunnel and killed 7 Hamas militants that Hamas unleashed its long-range arsenal and the overall number of launches jumps to over 80.

In other words, the macabre peeing contests currently taking place is not between Israel and Hamas, nor even Hamas and the PA, but between Hamas and the rest of the resistance camp. Real resistance movements can hit Tel Aviv or threaten to close down Ben Gurion airport; the rest are short range wannabes.

As was pointed out here, the murder/kidnapping in the West Bank demonstrates the extent to which Hamas has lost control. The suggestion that attackers planned to murder the teens from the start further confirms that the objective was to incite violence, undermine the unity deal and punish Hamas for even hinting at the prospect of moderation. Hostage negotiations require calm; murder brings swift retribution. While Hamas may have initially tried to manage the pace and scope of escalation, as the spiral of tit-for-tat increased in size and frequency, it came out of the corner swinging.

This escalation is a high-stakes, high-risk gamble made in effort to disprove its weakness, reassert control over its ranks and distance itself from chargers it has sold out in the interest of money and power like its Fatah rivals. There is also a ‘use it or lose it’ element to the rocket strikes. Most of this material, especially the long range stuff, was smuggled in overland from Sudan via Sinai. With a new regime in control in Egypt, that road is closed. As Israel’s strikes into the strip grew more ferocious, Hamas probably calculated they best launch them before they were vaporized. 

In the end, this gamble may pay off. The Hamas leadership is aware that neitherNetanyahu, President Sisi, nor President Obama want to see an all-out ground war in Gaza. All indications are that a ceasefire will be brokered before it gets to that point. Of course, in the fog and friction that currently has hold over the densely populated strip, neither side may be able to prevent the whirlwind they have sown.

Nevertheless, when a ceasefire is eventually reached — which it will be at the end of the day — Israel far prefers Hamas to chaos, and Hamas may gain access to the border and other perks, like the re-release of re-arrested prisoners that it can claim as the fruits of its righteous struggle. If such an outcome is on the account of a few hundred Palestinian civilians, so be it. Resistance after all, is a sacred endeavor, especially when it raises market share.

On Egypt's Role in Israel-Palestine Dispute

Got the following via email from an Ely Karmon.  Met Ely in 2010 at a counter-terrorism seminar.  The interesting thing to me is that Israeli leaders do seem to be willing to find a ceasefire solution.  Ely, as you will read below, thinks the only long-term full solution is one that is unworkable because of the high costs associated with the action (both human and political).  So, Ely sensibly lays out from an Israeli perspective what Egypt can/should do to help make things work.  For my two cents, this piece is a good start for thinking about the issue from the Israeli view.  No bones about it, this is an Israeli view, not a Palestinian view, and certainly not a Hamas view.  The bigger problem may just be that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have not really worked out the details of governing Gaza.

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At this hour, July 15 16:00, after Israel accepted the proposed ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt and hold fire since 9 am, Hamas rejected it and poured heavy rocket fire on South, Central and even northern Israel.

Therefore Israel decided at 14:00 to resume the aerial attacks against Hamas.

 

See below my analysis of the Egyptian brokered agreement and the elements it should include in order to change the done in the Gaza Strip.

In any scenario, Egypt is and will remain the most important regional actor and it will impact on the outcome of the present conflict.

 

In an interview on July 10th I argued that:

 

The overall solution to the problem of Hamas’ aggression is to conquer the entire Gaza Strip or a large part of it, go from house to house, find and destroy all the rockets and heavy weapons held by all of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.

 

However, I do not see Israel performing now such a move because of the anticipated major harm to the people of Gaza and to the Israeli soldiers and because of the harsh criticism and pressure sure to arrive from the international community after Israel will be forced to control for months and even longer a territory suffering huge from economic, social and political problems. 

 

I expressed my opinion that the Palestinian Authority, led by Abu Mazen, along with Egypt, must take over Gaza. The Palestinian Authority should be accorded a foothold in Gaza, where Israel's role is to provide ease of the blockade, more freedom to the economic activity in the Strip and freedom of movement. One must remember that Fatah still has hundreds of thousands of supporters in Gaza who are oppressed by Hamas and that there is an underground Tamarod movement, similar to the movement that helped General Sisi topple the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in July 2013.

 

Israel cannot occupy Gaza and transfer it to Abu Mazen as then he will be considered a traitor to his people.

 

The ceasefire agreement sponsored by Egypt – July 15. 2014

 

If indeed the ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt will be accepted by Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad which is operating to a certain extent in coordination with Iran, it is imperative that it include a number of essential elements:

  

-           Immediate deployment of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces along the Gaza/Egypt border and taking control of the Rafah crossing;

-           A clause stating that the Palestinian Authority will gradually regain control of the Gaza Strip;

-          No tunnels will be opened through the Egyptian border and Egypt will be responsible for preventing weapons smuggling, alongside the Palestinian Authority, possibly while updating Israel on significant violations;

-           A clause on international supervision over the rocket arsenal in Gaza;

-           No Hamas members, released in the Gilad Shalit agreement, who were arrested lately in the West Bank, will be released if they did not comply with their release agreement;

-           The political detainees from the last operation in the West Bank will be released;

-           Israel must announce a cessation of construction in the settlements for a period of one year to improve the political atmosphere in the West Bank and allow a return to peace negotiations, even if they do not achieve immediate results;

-           Israel will have to agree to significant reliefs in the transfer of goods to and from Gaza and use its influence in the West to provide generous economic and humanitarian aid;

-           Egypt will use its influence with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to provide extensive economic aid to the Palestinian Authority as the one responsible for the rebuilding of the Strip;

-           Qatar will not be given primacy in this area because of its destructive role in helping radical Islamist parties across the Arab world.

 

Egypt’s role is crucial in the pressure on Hamas to accept this agreement and implement it. 

 

It is clear to all that Egypt has a supreme political and security interest in weakening Hamas: currently, in the trial of former President Morsi and other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who are charged, among other things, of escaping from prison during the first days of the revolution, Hamas is accused of providing assistance to said escape (in parenthesis, during the court hearings Morsi called out slogans from his cell supporting Palestine).

 

Egypt, in addition to the destruction of tunnels, prevented in recent days smuggling of rockets from Gaza intended for firing against Israel, while at the same time, rockets were fired in the Sinai against the Egyptian security forces. 

 

If such an agreement will come to be, one should take into account that on the propaganda and political level part of the Palestinian and Arab public opinion may perceive Hamas as the winner in the present conflict, due to its success staging massive rocket attacks towards most of Israel without suffering heavy casualties among its military/terrorist ranks and its political leaders.

 

This can express itself in the results of future elections in the Palestinian Authority, if such elections take place.

 

It will be interesting to follow the struggle between Hamas’ military wing and the political wing regarding the acceptance of the agreement terms.

 

It is also interesting if the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) will reject the agreement even if accepted by Hamas, serving thus the interests of its Iranians sponsors.

 

It is probable that Salafi and Jihadi organizations in the region (Syria, Iraq,Yemen) will also be affected by Hamas’ success, as perceived by them, and they too will try to acquire rockets to further their goals or deter the countries fighting them.

 

 

Ely Karmon, PhD

Senior Research Scholar

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and

The Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at

The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC(

Herzlyia, Israel

Slow Week

This week has been a slow week for me.  Working hard on some research/survey projects and working harder on my summer fun (an afternoon of shotgun practice makes the world seem a little better to me).  Even in a slow week there are events in our world that raise questions and thoughts.  This week's big story is the growing exchange of hostility in Israel.  

I have spent some time considering a range of questions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This conflict as a study tool is a no brainer for conflict studies and particularly for intra-state conflict study.  I have even co-authored work looking at the ethnic and religious dimension of the conflict following a visit to Israel that began on the same day as the Mavi Marmara incident (May 31, 2010), contributing to this volume.

Interestingly a thoughtful piece about the "Iron Dome" defense system was published recently.  The group that I attended seminars with in 2010 were briefed about the development of this system and reading about the actual deployment and use of the system makes a believer out of me about the ability to create missile defense systems that actually can and will work.  For my two cents, the use of Iron Dome is the biggest story to emerge.  The root causes of the conflict betwen Israelis and Palestinians have not changed.  The issues of territory, governance and religion remain the same and as such the conflict itself is not really big news.  The amount of attention received is directly related to the continued importance to the developed world of having peace in a region of the world important for energy resources and other trade related issues both in the Middle East and the rest of the world.  Which means, nothing really new. but Iron Dome is showing us something new.  I am left to wonder if U.S. developments that began with the deployment of Patriot Missile batteries in the early 1990s have come as far as the Israeli system.

Famine

I have often pointed out to students and other interested parties that famine is generally the result of human behaviors that structurally induce scarcity of food.  Often the cause is government action directly designed to deny food from reaching portions of the population to force death and/or migration upon those people.  In other cases a cause of famine is the involvement of the working age population in violent conflicts that remove them from the labor pool that would be raising and distributing food.  

Right now in South Sudan aid workers are warning of potential famine.  At the same time, the UN is appealing for food aid in Africa.  For my two cents, we are seeing a "perfect storm" building.  The world public is somewhat aid weary at present.  Workers are fleeing the fields to enter the conflict or to flee the conflict.  The UN is already cutting food aid doles to refugees in Africa.  Famine is never inevitable, but famine is more likely now in South Sudan.  I am puzzled by this potential famine, though.  

In the 1980s famine in Ethiopia was a direct result of government policy that would not let food stuff in to the areas where drought and strife had most greatly impacted the population.  In the late 1990s and early part of the 2000s the Sudanese govt directly impacted local famine in areas of southern Sudan and Darfur where the govt of Sudan was sponsoring and directing violence against the black African population.  I have read nothing to indicate that the govt of South Sudan will block any food aid to the groups that the current government led by Salva Kiir accuses of supporting the rebels led by Riek Machar.  Concerns mount over attrocities perpetrated by both sides, though, and denial of food aid is a potential extension of these attrocities.  My puzzle is whether or not this famine will be the first that can be directly related to a lack of food availability rather than structurally (man-made) shortage of food?  Or, does the lack of food aid being made available equal a structural shortage, just not of the making of the local authority?  Will be watching and thinking more about this potential famine situation.